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A particularly instructive example 
is an experimental study of 
public- information use (the ability 
to assess the quality of a resource 
on the basis of the success of other 
individuals) in two closely related 
species of sticklebacks (Figure 1). 
Isabelle Coolen and colleagues 
recently found that nine- spined 
sticklebacks, after watching 
conspecific or heterospecific 
‘demonstrator’ fish feeding at 
two patches, when tested alone, 
tend to approach the former 
location of the richer patch. As 
their observational experience was 
restricted to the relative success of 
their demonstrators, and potential 
alternative explanations could 
be ruled out, they surmised that 
nine- spined sticklebacks were 
capable of public- information use. 
However, three-spined sticklebacks, 
when subject to the same test, swam 
with equal frequency to the former 
locations of rich and poor patches. 
These species were collected from 
the same streams, frequently shoal 
together, and feed on similar foods. 
Why should one species and not the 
other exhibit this specific form of 
social learning?
The answer to this conundrum 
comes from a surprising source: 
mathematical analyses of the 
adaptive advantages of human 
culture. Californian anthropologists 
Rob Boyd and Peter Richerson 
postulated a costly information 
hypothesis, which proposes an 
evolutionary trade-off between 
reliable but costly self- acquired 
information and potentially 
less reliable but cheap socially 
transmitted information. Here, the 
relative cost of acquiring personal 
information varies between the 
two stickleback species, which 
determines the value of public 
information. Three-spines have large 
spines and armoured body plates, 
robust structural defenses that allow 
them to sample alternative food 
patches directly, in relative safety. 
Such sampling by nine-spines, which 
have weaker physical defenses, 
would leave them vulnerable to 
predation, and hence in fitness 
terms would be extremely costly. 
Consequently, nine-spines spend 
much of their time in refuge, from 
where selection seemingly has 
favoured the ability to monitor the 
foraging success of others. Further 
research confirms that this species 
difference is robust.
In fact, considerable evidence is 
accumulating among fish, birds and 
mammals that animals will ignore 
social information under specific 
and predictable circumstances. For 
instance, nine-spine sticklebacks 
will ignore public information if they 
have reliable, up-to-date personal 
information, yet switch to exploiting 
public information if their personal 
information is unreliable or outdated. 
Social and personal information are 
not weighted equally, and animals 
will toggle between the two in a 
conditional manner, according 
to their respective reliability and 
cost. Evolved rules, labelled 
social learning strategies, dictate 
the circumstances under which 
individuals copy others, and when 
they rely on personal experience. 
One such rule — copy when asocial 
learning is costly — has already 
been described for sticklebacks, 
but there are likely to be many 
social learning strategies in nature 
(conform, copy the most successful 
individual, copy anyone doing better 
than you, and so on) and researchers 
are only now just beginning to 
investigate them. 
The study of animal culture is 
unmasking a fascinating and rich 
interplay between two inheritance 
systems — genes and culture — in 
which each has, to some extent,  
been shaped by the other.
Further reading
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P.J. (1985). Culture and 
the Evolutionary Process (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press).
Byrne, R.W., Barnard, P.J., Davidson, I., Janik, V.M., 
McGrew, W.C., Miklósi, A., and Wiessner, P. 
(2004). Understanding culture across species. 
Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 341–346.
Coolen, I., Day, R.L., and Laland, K.N. (2003). 
Species difference in adaptive use of public 
information in sticklebacks. Proc. Roy. Soc. 
Lond. B 270, 2413–2419.
Heyes, C.M., and Galef, B.G. Jr. (1996). Social 
Learning in Animals: The Roots of Culture.  
(San Diego: Academic Press).
Hoppitt, W., and Laland, K.N. (2008). Social 
processes influencing learning in animals: a 
review of the evidence. Adv. Stud. Behav.,  
in press.
Laland, K.N. (2004). Social learning strategies. In 
Special edition on Studies of Social Learning 
and Imitation, B.G. Galef Jr. and C.M. Heyes., 
eds. Learn. Behav. 32, 4–14.
Laland, K.N., and Janik, V. (2006). The animal 
cultures debate. Trends Ecol. Evol. 21, 542–547.
School of Biology, University of St. Andrews, 
Bute Medical Buildings, Westburn Lane,  
Fife KY16 9TS, UK.  
E-mail: knl1@st-andrews.ac.ukChimpanzees infer 
the location of a 
reward on the basis 
of the effect of its 
weight
Daniel Hanus and Josep Call
The extent to which animals in 
general, and non-human primates 
in particular, understand physical 
causality is currently unclear [1,2]. 
One way to assess an animal’s 
causal understanding is to test its 
ability to analyze a causal chain 
backwards — to infer cause from 
an effect [3]. In the study reported 
here, chimpanzees saw a given 
outcome (effect) of an action 
and had to infer the preceding 
event (cause) in order to solve 
the problem. More specifically, 
subjects saw a banana being hidden 
inside one of two opaque cups 
mounted on opposite sides of a 
balanced beam, but they were kept 
ignorant about the banana’s exact 
location. Subsequently, the subjects 
witnessed the balance beam tilting 
to one side after the experimenter 
released it from its equilibrium 
position (the Balance condition). 
The chimpanzees preferentially (and 
from trial one) selected the lower, 
compared to the upper, cup. Two 
control conditions demonstrated 
that the chimpanzee subjects lacked 
an intrinsic preference for the lower 
cup when there was no movement 
involved (the Wedge condition) or 
when the balance beam was tilted 
by the experimenter’s action (the 
Non-causal balance condition). 
We conclude that the chimpanzee 
subjects of our experiments 
demonstrated evidence of causal 
inference based on an object’s 
weight.
In our experiments, the 
chimpanzee subjects selected 
the baited cup significantly above 
chance in the Balance condition 
(see the Supplemental data available 
on-line for details). We compared 
the Balance condition to two 
control conditions. In the Wedge 
condition, the cups were mounted 
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so that they simulated the position 
of the cups in the titled balance 
position. This condition allowed us 
to assess whether subjects simply 
showed an intrinsic preference 
for the bottom cup. The subjects 
performed significantly better in the 
Balance condition than in the Wedge 
condition. Analyzing the first trial 
performance confirmed this result. 
All eight subjects in the Balance 
condition selected the bottom cup, 
but only four out of eight subjects 
did so in the Wedge condition. It is 
remarkable that for subjects that 
began with the Balance condition 
(group 1), a comparison between 
the last Balance-block with the 
first Wedge- block revealed that 
they significantly decreased their 
performance by 30% (Figure 1). In 
contrast, subjects that began with 
the Wedge condition (group 2)  
significantly improved their 
performance by 18% when 
comparing the last Wedge-block 
to the first Balance-block. We 
tested the Non-causal balance 
control condition on a new group of 
subjects. In this condition subjects 
witnessed the same beam movement 
as in the Balance condition, except 
that the movement was caused by 
the experimenter pushing down the 
balance beam, not by the weight of 
the reward. This condition allowed 
us to assess whether subjects 
simply preferred the cup that 
followed a downward trajectory 
independently of its cause. Subjects 
performed significantly better in 
the Balance than in the Non-causal 
balance condition (Figure 2). In 
general, there was no significant 
improvement in performance across 
blocks of trials within any of the 
three conditions.
Our results suggest that 
chimpanzees inferred the location of 
the reward based on the movement 
and the resultant final position of 
the balance on which the cups were 
mounted. This result was not due to 
an intrinsic preference for the bottom 
cup, because subjects lacked such 
a preference in the first trial of the 
Wedge condition. Arguably, subjects 
may have been particularly attracted 
by falling (rather than raising) 
trajectories, as shown for cotton- top 
tamarins and human infants younger 
than 2.5 years of age [4,5]. We can 
rule out that explanation, however, 
because subjects did not show 
such preference in the Non-causal 
balance condition. Therefore, 
it is conceivable that subjects 
selected the bottom cup because 
they inferred that the presence 
of the reward, and its weight in 
particular, caused the balance to 
tilt. These data support the notion 
that chimpanzees more easily solve 
tasks whose elements hold a causal 
rather than an arbitrary relation [2,6]. 
Subjects’ flawless performance in 
the first trial ruled out the possibility 
that they learned to respond in 
this way during the course of the 
experiment.
Furthermore, the chimpanzee 
subjects that received the Wedge 
condition first increased their 
performance when confronted with 
the Balance condition, whereas the 
subjects that were tested with the 
Balance condition first decreased 
their subsequent performance upon 
encountering the Wedge condition. 
This shows that the chimpanzee 
subjects clearly detected the 
difference between the two 
conditions. More importantly, these 
results make a ‘choosing the lower 
cup’ heuristic untenable, because 
once the subjects were already 
choosing the bottom cup in the 
Balance condition, it is unclear why 
they would decrease their preference 
for the bottom cup drastically in the 
following Wedge condition.
A typical approach to investigating 
causal understanding in non-human 
animals is to test their ability to 
anticipate the effect that their own 
action will have on certain elements 
of the physical world. If they 
understand the underlying causal 
principle then they are expected 
to act accordingly towards a 
wanted outcome — in most cases, 
access to food [3,7]. In general, 
tool-using behavior is a typical 
example for the ‘productive’ aspect 
in causal reasoning. According to 
the definition of Visalberghi and 
Tomasello [7], ‘comprehensive’ 
or ‘postdictive’ abilities can be 
postulated when subjects solve a 
problem by inferring the preceding 
event (the cause), on the basis of 
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Figure 1. Mean percent of trials (±SEM) in which subjects selected the lower cup for subse-
quent testing blocks of different conditions. 
For group 1, performance of the last balance-block (trial 17–32) is compared with the first 
wedge-block (trial 33–48). For group 2, the performance of the last wedge-block (trial 17–32) is 
compared with the first balance-block (trial 33–48). Asterisk: p < 0.05.
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Fasting or feasting 
in a fish social 
hierarchy
Marian Y.L. Wong, Philip L. Munday, 
Peter M. Buston and Geoffrey P. Jones
Understanding why and how 
subordinates of many social animals 
remain consistently smaller than 
dominants is important for determining 
the mechanisms underlying the 
structure and stability of hierarchical 
societies. Here we show that 
competition over food and conflict 
over social rank are ultimately 
responsible for the regulation of 
subordinate growth in the group-living 
reef fish, Paragobiodon xanthosomus 
(Gobiidae). Subordinates benefit from 
reducing their own food intake, and 
hence growth, when they approach 
a size where they risk conflict with 
dominants. Dieting appears to be a 
behavioural mechanism ensuring that 
subordinates remain smaller than 
dominants within the hierarchy.
P. xanthosomus is a goby that lives 
in colonies of the coral Seriatophora 
hystrix. Inside colonies, they form 
groups of up to 20 gobies: a breeding 
male and female (dominant breeders) 
plus several smaller non-breeding 
females (subordinate non-breeders) 
[1]. Subordinate non-breeders 
are organised into a size-based 
hierarchy with each female remaining 
consistently smaller than the one 
ranked above it [2]. Hierarchies 
function as queues for breeding. When 
a dominant dies, all subordinates 
below it grow and shift up in rank. Only 
when they reach the front of the queue 
can they breed [2].
Traditionally, subordinate growth 
regulation in size-based hierarchies 
has been viewed as a non-adaptive 
consequence of competition over 
limiting food resources — subordinates 
are out-competed by dominants, obtain 
less food and grow more slowly [3]. 
More recently, an alternative adaptive 
perspective has emerged — in 
hierarchies where body size determines 
dominance rank and rank determines 
reproductive opportunity, conflict 
over rank between dominant and 
subordinates is thought to select for 
social regulation of subordinate growth 
[2,4,5]. We tested the relative effects of 
both processes by training subordinate  a given outcome (the effect). We 
argue that the current study revealed 
evidence that chimpanzees can 
engage in the ‘comprehensive’ 
aspect of causal reasoning with 
regard to object weight. Further 
research is needed to clarify whether 
such basic comprehensive aspect 
of causal reasoning represents a 
precursor of more sophisticated 
forms of physical reasoning found in 
adults involving abstract concepts 
such as gravity.
Supplemental data
Supplemental data are available at http://
www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/
full/18/9/R370/DC1
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Figure 2. Mean percent of trials (±SEM) in which subjects selected the lower cup as a function 
of condition. 
Only the first 32 trials for each group are included, with the first block containing trial number 
1–16 and the second block containing trial number 17-32. Double asterisk: p < 0.001.
